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Recasting Complaints:
An Argument for Procedural Alternatives
Paul David Menair*
In the time that has passed since the academic debate regarding
“substance-specific”   procedure   reform   that   took   place   during   the   1980’s  
and  1990’s,  numerous  changes  in the civil procedure landscape targeted at
specific substantive categories of litigation have either been formally
adopted in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or judicially adopted,
despite the continuing trans-substantive premise of the Rules. This Article
suggests that increased tailoring of procedure to specific cases may be
inevitable and that reformers could better approach such tailoring by
creating alternative non-exclusive procedural mechanisms, rather than by
adapting existing procedure to the  “type”  of  case  in  a  mandatory  fashion.    
This   approach,   modeled   after   the   variety   of   “special   statutory  
proceedings”  that  currently  exist  in  state  law,  would  encourage  and  allow  
reformers to avoid political conflict and the inevitable unintended
consequences of containerizing lawsuits into litigation categories like the
“product   liability   case.”      The   approach might also help address some of
the other concerns of critics of substance-specific procedure, such as the
threat of a return to technical rules of common law pleading.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a young lawyer who has filed a lawsuit against a
trustee in a state court. Your complaint demands, among other things, an
“accounting”  of  the  trust  fund.1 Perhaps you are not entirely sure what that
thing  called  an  “accounting”  would  actually  look  like  if  you  got  it,  but  you  
ask for it anyway.2
Now imagine that, with your complaint, you diligently sent out a
complete set of written discovery requests, including routine requests for
copies of account statements and other financial records of the trust—
material that you believed to be eminently within the scope of allowable
discovery   under   your   state’s   civil   procedure   code.3 In response, you
*

J.D., Georgia State University, 2003.
See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 4.3(5) (2d ed.
1993) (discussing the accounting remedy).
2 You would not be alone in being confused. See Joel Eichengrun, Remedying the Remedy of
Accounting, 60 IND. L.J. 463, 476 (1985) (citing cases showing   that   “some   confusion   remains”   with  
respect to the meaning of the accounting remedy in contemporary practice).
3 Most likely modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) (defining the scope of
1
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receive an objection stating that your opponent refuses to provide the
requested  material  because  to  do  so  would  be  the  “functional  equivalent”  of  
the relief sought in your demand for an accounting.4
Assuming there are no controlling cases in your jurisdiction to show
that this is clearly wrong, what does one make of this assertion? On the
one hand, it seems ludicrous to contend that a trustee can avoid producing
ordinarily discoverable documents just because the complaint includes a
demand that the court order the defendant to do something that seems
conceptually similar.5 On the other hand, there is certain logic to the
argument  that  if  a  demand  for  an  “accounting”  is  understood  as  a  demand  
that the court order the defendant to produce certain information, it seems
unfair to allow the plaintiff to get the same information without having to
first prove entitlement to the remedy.6
This confusion arises from competing understandings of the
accounting remedy.
Some would argue that at least one such
understanding—accounting as a procedural mechanism for obtaining
information about the trust fund—has been rendered meaningless by
contemporary discovery practices, even if it continues to haunt the legal
imagination.7 The confusion has led to a call for reform of the substantive
law  by  “remedying  the  remedy”  of  accounting  to make it clear that what is
meant is simply accounting for profits as an element of damages.8
However, contemporary discovery practice may be an imperfect substitute
for the remedial discovery conducted under pre-reform equity procedure—
managed discovery conducted before a special master after a preliminary
showing of entitlement to the judicial resources of the court.9 Accordingly,
this recollection of the old meaning of accounting may suggest the
possibility   of   innovation   in   the   form   of   “selective   substance-specific
procedure.”10
discovery  as  including  “any  nonprivileged  matter  that  is  relevant  to  any  party’s  claim  or  defense”).
4 The author has encountered this objection on several occasions in practice.
5 See Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 476 (arguing that contemporary discovery practice makes the
aspect  of  the  remedy  that  he  calls  “accounting  for  discovery”  obsolete).
6 Eichengrun  argues  that  this  “logic”  is  simply  confusion  arising  from  a  misunderstanding of the
remedy. See id. The present author will present a somewhat different argument. See infra Part IV.
7 See Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 476; see also DOBBS, supra note 1, § 4.3(5) (adopting
Eichengrun’s  description  of  the  remedy  in  contemporary  practice).
8 See Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 476.
9 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA §§ 436–45 (13th ed. 1988) (describing the remedy in equity under the old
system).
10 See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for
Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 28–29   (1994)   (proposing   “selective  
substance-specific   procedure”   as   alternative   terminology   for   what   commentators had previously
described as  “non-trans-substantive  procedure.”);;  see also Robert Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some
Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1974) (initiating the discussion of substance
specific reform); Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L.
Rev.  1155,  1159  (2006)  (arguing  that  Cover’s  “deeper  point”  was  that  “sometimes  the  justification  for  a  
procedural  choice  necessarily  had  to  take  account  of  substantive  policies,”  and  there  may  be  value  in  
making this connection explicit); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
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Any proposal to adapt different procedures to different types of civil
action inevitably harkens back to the dark, ancient days of common law
pleading rules—a frightening prospect for some.11 Contemporary civil
procedure professors  mention  the  “forms  of  action,”  if  they  mention them
at all, as being only of limited and primarily theoretical interest to the
contemporary student.12 The fundamental premise of civil procedure as it
is taught in law school today is derived from Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of
Civil  Procedure:  “There  is  one  form  of  action.”13 This  “trans-substantive”  
premise of civil practice assumes that the entire scope of civil litigation is
best governed by a single set of procedural rules.14 Since  the  late  1980’s,  
certain academics have advocated a partial return to substance-specific
procedure.15 However, other scholars have roundly criticized any proposal
to depart from the trans-substantive premise. These critics insist that
substance specificity would open the door to the evils supposedly
associated with the old system—notably a waste of judicial resources in
settling procedural disputes and resolving cases on technicalities rather than
on the merits.16

Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1929–41 (1989) (defending substance
specificity and criticizing proponents of trans-substantivity for relying on judicial discretion to tailor
general rules to individual cases in the name of procedural neutrality); Carl Tobias, The Transformation
of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501,  1508  (1992)  (arguing  that  “the  trans-substantive
center  will  not  hold”);;  Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting  Devolution  or  Bleak  to  the  Future:  Subrin’s  NewOld Procedure   as   a   Possible   Antidote   to   Dreyfuss’s   “Tolstoy   Problem,”   46   FLA. L. REV. 57 (1994)
(discussing  Subrin’s  specific  proposals).
11 See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067,
2068 (1989) (describing substance-specific  procedure  as  “a  ghost  in  the  darkness  surrounding  academic  
discussions of the future  of  civil  procedure.”).
12 See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 371–93 (4th ed. 3d prtg. 1996). Yeazell
duly  notes  Subrin’s  argument  for  a  selective  return  to  substance  specific  procedure but maintains that
the primary reason why students should understand common law pleading is its relevance to
understanding its lingering impact on substantive law. See id. at 372–73 (citing Stephen Subrin, How
Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
909 (1987) [hereinafter How Equity Conquered]).
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 2; see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 12 (discussing the
evolution of contemporary civil practice).
14 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 11,   at   2068   (“[J]udicially-made rules directing courts to
proceed differently according to the substantive nature of the rights enforced is an idea that has been
wisely rejected in the past and must be rejected for the present  and  for  the  future.”).
15 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 11. For a brief summary of arguments in favor of transsubstantive procedural rules, see William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1885 (2002):
First, trans-substantive rules are efficient. If the same set of procedural rules governs every
form of action, lawyers and judges need only master this one form. Moreover, transsubstantive rules are efficient in that adjudicatory resources do not have to be expended
determining which rules of procedure to apply to a given action. Second, trans-substantive
rules make procedure more transparent and adjudication on the merits more likely, because
the time not spent on selecting the appropriate procedural rules can instead be spent
assessing the merits of the action. Finally, trans-substantive rules appear fair because all
cases  are  treated  ‘equally.’
(footnote omitted).
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It  is  worth  noting  that  “substance-specific  procedure”  does  exist, and
always has existed, at the state level. Take, for example, procedures for
eviction of a non-paying tenant.17 For obvious practical reasons, an
eviction   proceeding   cannot   conform   to   the   contours   of   a   “civil   action”   in  
which the parties exchange pleadings, bicker about discovery for six
months or more, and then attempt to try the case by motion.18 Accordingly,
the state legislatures have enacted or retained special statutory proceedings
adapted to the needs of landlords for prompt eviction of non-paying tenants
despite protestations in state civil procedure codes about there being only
one allowable form of civil action.19
In light of this stubborn persistence of substance-specific civil
procedure at the state level, despite the efficiency supposedly derived from
the exorcism of substance from procedure in contemporary civil practice,
one suspects that something other than fidelity to an abstract principle was
driving the negative reaction to the discussion of substance-specific
procedure during the 1980’s  and  1990’s.    It  is  apparent  that  the  defenders  
of civil trans-substantivity did not fear the proposals for substance-specific
reform in the abstract so much as the potential havoc that interested parties
could wreak in the rule-making process if such reform were to occur in
politically-charged contexts such as civil rights litigation.20
Paul
Carrington, the harshest critic, describes what he believes was really going
on as follows:
[N]umerous academics were proposing to make the Rules non-trans-substantive
in the misguided belief that this would advance the ability of civil rights

17 See Randy G. Gerchick, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer
and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1994) (discussing
summary eviction). For an attempt to argue around the existence of such substance-specific procedure,
see Carrington, supra note 11, at 2079–80  (“There  are,  to  be  sure,  rules   specifically  applicable  to  the  
representation of corporate shareholders, suits in admiralty, or proceedings in eminent domain. These
rules do not apply to litigation between individuals disputing liability for an auto accident. Such special
rules  are  exceptional  in  their  limited  application.”)  (footnotes  omitted).
18 See Gerchick, supra note 17, at 764:
Intending to provide landlords a more cost-effective means of removing problem tenants
than would otherwise be available, most states have established summary eviction
proceedings, which move the landlord's eviction lawsuit through the court system much
faster than in most civil proceedings by (1) allowing litigation only of issues that are
immediately relevant to determining which party retains the right to possession of the rental
unit, (2) drastically reducing the time a tenant has to answer the complaint or conduct
discovery, and (3) requiring the trial to take place within twenty days of the landlord's
request for a trial date.
(footnote omitted).
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 11, at 2074–75:
Moreover, if the procedure rules were the result of a test of strength among political
organizations, it is obvious, at least in our political system, that rules would generally favor
those  litigants  with  the  greater  resources,  especially  those  identifiable  ‘repeat  players’  who  
have the larger stakes in procedure rules and hence the greater political energy.
(footnote omitted).
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plaintiffs to enforce their claims; I was obliged to resist that idea on the ground
that it would have put the rulemaking process into the political cockpit.21

Whatever one makes of the arguments for and against transsubstantivity, the attempt by scholars like Carrington to draw a line in the
sand against substance-specific reform has begun to fail at the federal level.
There have been recent changes in the judicial application of purportedly
trans-substantive procedural rules with a substance-specific component,
primarily the erection of barriers against certain types of litigation in the
form of heightened pleading standards—exactly the sort of unfortunate
“political”  outcome that scholars feared would arise if we opened the door
to expressly substance-specific reform in the rule-making process.22
The example of the special statutory proceeding for eviction suggests
that   tailoring   procedure   to   cases,   even   if   “political,”   may be the only
acceptable compromise in some instances.23
While some might
conceivably argue that a proceeding against a non-paying tenant should be
procedurally   “equal”   to   any   other   lawsuit,   states   have   developed   or  
maintained through the political process alternative procedural
mechanisms.24 The further evolution of substance-specific civil procedure
is not necessarily evil and is likely inevitable. A model for approaching it
can be found in state ancillary, non-exclusive   “special   statutory  
21 Paul Carrington, Civil Procedure and Politics, http://www.paulcarrington.com/Civil%20
Procedure%20Politics.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2008). An example of the type of substance-specific
argument that Professor Carrington was objecting to can be found in Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race
Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85,
105–12 (1994), in which the author argues that Rule 12 dismissals of civil rights claims are often the
result of racial subordination and that no civil rights case should be subject to dismissal until after the
parties  have  engaged  in  discovery.    For  a  critique  of  Carrington’s  position,  see  Burbank,  supra note 10,
at 1935–36:
Professor Carrington is alert to the costs of departing from the appearance   of   “political  
neutrality”   but   deaf   to   the   costs   of   what   Judge   Weinstein   calls   “procedural   subterfuge.”    
Indeed, at times he appears to swallow his own propaganda, as when he portrays as a
central   feature   of   our   legal   system,   upon   which   Congress   “relies,”   the   class   action  
amendments in 1966, yet fails to acknowledge that the impact of those amendments on
power relations was anticipated, if not intended, by his predecessor, Judge Kaplan.
(footnote omitted).
22 See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1059–64
(2003) (discussing judicially created heightened pleading standards); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling
Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998) (same); Jeffrey A. Parness, Amy M.
Leonetti & Austin W. Bartlett, The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws, 78 NEB. L.
REV. 412 (1999) (reviewing new substance-specific pleading standards relating to securities litigation,
professional malpractice litigation, punitive damages claims, childhood sexual abuse claims and civil
rights claims, and arguing that these amount to revision of the underlying substantive law, raising
choice of law and separation of powers issues). For the law and economics argument in favor of such
heightened pleading standards, see Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The
Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper
Series, Law and Economics Working Paper No. 06-06, 2006). See also Burbank, supra note 10, at
1929–41  (arguing  in  the  1980’s  that  procedural uniformity has always been a sham).
23 See Tobias, supra note 10,  at  1508  and  throughout  (“The  preferable  approach  is  to  transcend  
trans-substantivity, to acknowledge candidly its limitations, and to recognize and meet forthrightly the
compelling challenge of formulating procedures that will efficaciously treat civil litigation in the
twenty-first  century.”).
24 Although the devil is, of course, in the details. See Gerchick, supra note 17, at 777–81.
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proceedings.”    Rather than directly attempt substance-specific reform in the
context of the fraught and contentious federal procedure reform process,
where most of the players are heavily invested in complex cases and have
little interest in or knowledge of the more routine cases, the expansion of
ancillary procedures at the state level might provide a laboratory for
experimentation with smaller cases that could ultimately be adopted at the
federal level.25
Instead of the heightened pleading standards and other mechanisms
proposed by those who would depart from the spirit and letter of the federal
rules only when they deem it necessary to keep people out of the
courthouse, the rules should provide for streamlined, tailored procedures in
appropriate cases as an alternative to procedural rules tailored to meet the
conflicting demands of litigants in the most complex, expensive, and
discovery-intensive cases.
By focusing on providing procedural
alternatives, as   opposed   to   defining   all   lawsuits   by   “type,”   substancespecific procedure reform might avoid the potential for boundary disputes
among  revived  “forms  of  action”  because  the  focus  would be on what the
pleading parties want, as opposed to what theory of action will most closely
conform to the facts as developed in discovery.26 Finally, a focus on
providing procedural alternatives, as opposed to tailoring default rules to
different types of cases, could help de-politicize the debate regarding
substance-specific reform.
To clarify what critics of substance specificity fear, Part I of this
article   begins   by   discussing   “substance-specific procedure”   as   it   used   to  
exist, using the example of the forms of action with respect to title to land.
Part II examines a specific set of special statutory proceedings established
in Georgia with respect to title actions, showing that the existence of these
procedures has neither led to technical pleading requirements nor the other
evils critics associate with non-trans-substantive procedure. Part III looks
at the example of the action for accounting and discusses whether there
exists a specific set of cases that might benefit from the revival of an
ancient remedy—the judicially managed accounting—in the form of an
ancillary substance-specific proceeding. Part IV discusses how revival of
the original conception of accounting as a discovery-oriented remedy might
relate to standing proposals for the reform of discovery practice in general.

25 See Mark C. Weber, The Federal Civil Rules Amendments of 1993 and Complex Litigation: A
Comment on Trans-substantivity and Special Rules for Large and Small Federal Cases, 14 REV. LITIG.
113 (1994) (arguing that the Federal Rules are well-adapted to complex litigation for a variety of
historical  reasons  and  that  substance  specific  reform  should  focus  on  streamlining  “small”  cases).
26 Compare with Carrington, supra note   11,   at   2081   (“The   teaching   of   [the   Anglo-American
tradition’s]  adverse  experience  is  that  complexity resulting from categorization of procedures in courts
of general or broad subject matter jurisdiction produces wasteful disputes as to which set of procedural
rules controls.”).
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I. TITLE ACTIONS AND THE PREHISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY PROCEDURE
To assist in developing an understanding of the debate regarding
trans-substantivity,   one   should   recall   what   “substance-specific”   procedure
looked like in the era prior to the evolution of trans-substantive procedure
in the nineteenth century. One window into the world of writ pleading is
the history of title actions in the common law—a history that was once a
core aspect of the first-year legal curriculum but is increasingly forgotten as
fewer civil procedure instructors feel the need to explain to their students
that there once was more than one form of action.27
Note that the history retold here is not necessarily the history of title
actions as it might be told by a contemporary historian based on
contemporary research. Rather, it is the history of the forms of action
respecting title to land as that story was known and told during the decades
around the turn of the last century—during the era of procedural reform.28
The story, as told by Frederick Maitland in a series of lectures first
published in 1909, begins with the writ of right, which read something like
this:
Breve de recto
Rex K (a bishop, baron or other lord of manor) salutem. Praecipimus tibi quod
sine dilatione plenum rectum teneas A de uno mesuagio cum pertinentiis in
Trumpingtone quod clamat tenere de te per liberum servitium [unius denarii per
annum] pro omni servitio, et quod X ei deforciat. Et nisi feceris, vicecomes de
Cantabrigia faciat, ne amplius inde clamorem audiamus pro defectu recti.
The King to K greeting. We command you that without delay you do full right
to A of one messuage with the appurtenances in Trumpington which he claims to
hold of you by free service of [so much] per annum for all service, of which X

27 See YEAZELL, supra note 12,   at   372   (“Until   a   few   decades   ago   the material in this section
[discussing the forms of action] would have taken up almost all of a beginning civil procedure
course.”);;  see also Mary Brigid McManoman, The History of the Civil Procedure Course: A Study In
Evolving Pedagogy, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 397 (1998) (discussing the evolution of the contemporary civil
procedure course).
28 For a discussion of the history of procedural reform in the early twentieth century, see Subrin,
How Equity Conquered, supra note 12, at 943–75. Our version of the story of the forms of action at
common law mainly derives from F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.H.
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1965) (1909). This focus reduces the relevance
of the fact that traditional narrative relies on the explanatory framework represented by the term
“feudalism;;”  a  term  largely  abandoned  by  medievalists.    See Elizabeth A.R. Brown, The Tyranny of a
Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe, 79 AM. HIST. REV. 1063 (1974) (arguing
against “feudalism”   as   a   conceptual   framework   for   understanding   medieval   society);;   SUSAN
REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND VASSALS: THE MEDIEVAL EVIDENCE REINTERPRETED (1994) (same). However,
it is worth noting that, despite a near consensus among historians against the utility of the traditional
feudal pyramid as a lens through which to understand medieval texts, the idea persists in legal literature.
See, e.g., Mark A. Senn, English Life and Law in the Time of the Black Death, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 507,  516  (2003)  (“As a system of land ownership, [feudalism] is a pyramid with the king at the
top beholden to no one, layers of lords in the middle beholden to their superiors, and serfs at the bottom
beholden  to  everyone.”).

MENAIR

340

3/23/2009 7:03 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 12:333

deforceth him. And unless you will do this, let the sheriff of Cambridge do it
that we may hear no more clamour thereupon for want of right.29

There are a few things to note in this. First, the writ is addressed to
the lord of the territory in which a property dispute has arisen, commanding
that person to give justice to someone who claims to have a right to land
“by  free  service”  in  that  territory  (i.e.,  a  tenancy  in  land  of  some  sort  within  
the  lord’s  larger  territory).30 Setting aside the vexed question of the manner
in  which  a  tenancy  “by  free  service”  might  differ  from  what  we  would  in  
present terms understand to be a fee simple estate,31 the purpose of the writ
is to initiate a process designed to identify who has the right to this
property,  whatever  that  “right”  may  consist  of.32 The second thing to note
is that the King is assuming the authority to tell the territorial lord what to
do about the claim, but the action is not initially  in  the  King’s  court.    It  is  to  
be  initiated,  rather,  in  the  local  courts  controlled  by  “K,”  and  the  writ  itself  
is  simply  a  threat  to  intervene  if  the  local  lord’s  court  does  not  resolve the
matter.33
As Maitland tells the story, there also were writs of right directing the
sheriff to take immediate action—originally used only in cases involving
claims  by  or  affecting  the  King’s  own  direct  tenants,  which  later  came  to  be  
used as a vehicle for direct intervention in territorial disputes outside of the
king’s   personal   territory—leading to tension between the King and his
barons:
In saying that this simple writ . . . was only used when the demandant claimed to
hold of the king as tenant in chief, we have been guilty of some inaccuracy.
Glanville tells us that such a writ is issued when the king pleases; Henry II was
not very careful of the interests of mesne lords and would send a [writ] to the
sheriff when a Writ of Right addressed to the lord would have been more in
harmony with feudal principles. But this was regarded as a tyrannical abuse and
was struck at by a clause of the Great Charter.34

So, there is conflict here respecting jurisdiction, which shall be discussed
further in a moment.
There were, Maitland explains, various problems associated with the
writ from the outset. The first and perhaps most important was that the
mode of trial was trial by combat.35 The second problem was delay.36 In
addition to various customary mechanisms allowing the parties to delay
MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 82–83 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 23.
31 See Joshua C. Tate, Ownership and Possession in the Early Common Law, 48 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 280, 282–84   (criticizing   Maitland’s   assumption   of   a   rough   equivalence   between   medieval  
concepts   of   “right”   and   “seisin”   and   contemporary   notions   of   “ownership”   and   “possession”).      See
generally S.F.C. MILSOM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (2003).
32 MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 21–27.
33 Id. at 22–23.
34 Id. at 23.
35 Id. at 26.
36 Id. at 24.
29
30
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trial—the most extreme being, apparently, a right to take to bed for a year
and avoid the whole thing—the entire process depended at a certain basic
level on individuals finding the time to represent themselves in a world
without trial lawyers.37 Accordingly, there was any number of excuses for
non-appearance that would not be tolerated in today’s  regime  of  advocacy  
by representatives.38
As Maitland notes, new procedures arose to mitigate these problems
that, not coincidentally, served the royal interest in consolidating legal
authority in the King.39 Indeed,   this   is   Maitland’s   primary   theme.      The  
forms of action grew increasingly elaborate through discrete attempts to
resolve difficulties with earlier writs, a process largely driven by the
tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces acting on the distribution
of authority in medieval society, leaving the substantive law to grow and
develop  “in  the  interstices  of  procedure.”40
The  initial  development  was  the  emergence  of  the  “assizes”  of  Novel  
Disseisin,   Mort   d’Ancestor,   Darrein   Presentment,   and   Utrum.41 These
were procedures responding to specific land issues in which resort could be
had to a royal court in the first instance, with trial by a deliberative body
known  as  an  “assize.”42 For our purposes, the latter two possessory assizes
are worth ignoring because an understanding of them would require an
unnecessary detour into the history of ecclesiastic land tenure and what was
known  as  “advowson,”  the  right  of  certain  landholders to appoint persons
to hold church office.43 But  Novel  Dissein  and  Mort  d’Ancestor  are  worth  
briefly considering.
Novel Disseisin was an assize available to a person claiming to have
been  unjustly  dispossessed  of  “seisin,”  a  concept  reduced  by  Maitland  and
reducible for our purposes to meaning simply possession of the land
pursuant to a claim of freehold title (as opposed to and distinct from an
absolute   right   to   the   land   equivalent   to   “ownership”   in   the   contemporary  
sense).44 In modern terms, this action would be somewhat analogous to an
action for wrongful eviction, except that it was not an action between
landlord and tenant as we would understand those terms, and no rights
other than the right to immediate possession were determined in the action,
with the  only  question  being  whether  the  “disseisor”  unjustly  deprived  the  
plaintiff of possession.45 Having lost, the disseisor could still dispossess
Id. at 25.
Id. at 24–25.
39 Id. at 25–26.
40 Id. at 1.
41 Id. at 27–33.
42 Id. at 34–35.
43 But see Tate, supra note 31, at 283–84 (arguing that the advowson writs have not received
sufficient attention by scholars).
44 MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 27–29. But see Tate, supra note 31, at 295–99 (arguing against
this alleged equivalence).
45 MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 27–28.
37
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the plaintiff in an action on a writ of right.46 The understanding that the
case was solely about possession, as opposed to what we would think of as
ownership, allowed the King to assert jurisdiction over the case despite the
local   lords’   claim   that   the   rights   of   their   “tenants”   should   be   decided   in  
their local courts.47
The   Assize   Mort   d’Ancestor   was   similarly   conceived as a matter of
possession rather than right.48 In this form of action, an heir would attempt
to show that his near  ancestor  died  “seised”  of  the  land  and  that  someone  
had taken seisin in the property before the plaintiff was able to do so
himself.49 Once again, the action did not determine rights to the land in the
same manner as the writs of right did, with the only question being who
was entitled to immediate possession of the land.50
These new forms of action remained procedurally onerous, so litigants
continued to seek alternatives.51 In the next phase of procedural
development, instead of expanding on the assizes, the procedures in land
cases in the crown courts expanded by the development of a profusion of
“Writs   of   Entry.”52 Like the assizes, these writs excused the royal
assumption of jurisdiction over proprietary rights to land outside of the
King’s  own  property  by  limiting  the  action  to  a  consideration  of  who  had  
the right to seisin, without any determination as to who had the ultimate
proprietary right to the land.53 Unlike the assizes, however, the theory
underlying the writs of entry was that one of a variety of possible specific
and recent incidents (depending on the form of writ) justified a claim that
the seisin of the one in possession was improper and an immediate demand
that the possessor abandon the property.54 By a proliferation of these forms
of   action,   the   royal   courts   blurred   the   “feudal”   distinction   between  
proprietary actions, which needed to be brought in the courts where the
tenancy was located, and purely possessory actions, which could be
brought in a more efficient manner in the royal courts.55
In the next phase of evolution, the pendulum shifted against the royal
prerogative to expand the number of writs, with one exception opening up a
whole new line of expansion into the realm of what we would today call
tort law:
The whole system stiffens. Men have learnt that a power to invent new remedies
is a power to create new rights and duties, and it is no longer to be suffered that

Id. at 28.
Id. at 27.
48 Id. at 29–30.
49 Id. at 29.
50 Id. at 27–30.
51 Id. at 41–45.
52 Id. at 41–42.
53 Id. at 44.
54 Id. at 42.
55 Id. at 44. For a more recent discussion of these writs, see Joseph Biancalana, The Origin and
Early History of the Writs of Entry, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 513 (2007).
46
47
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the chancellor or the judges should wield this power. . . . But when we say that
but little use was made of this Statute there is one great exception. It is regarded
as the statutory warrant for the variation of the writs of trespass so as to suit
special cases, until at length—about the end of the Middle Ages—lawyers
perceive  that  they  have  a  new  form  ‘Trespass  upon  the  special  case’  or  ‘Case.’56

Out of the law of trespass arose the action of ejectment, designed to
protect from dispossession tenants in the contemporary sense (i.e., persons
with a right to occupy the land for a term, as opposed to free tenants in
fee).57 Because the writs of right and entry and the assizes were subject to
procedural delay and hyper-technical rules of pleading, plaintiffs developed
a legal fiction to recover possession of land. They would lease the property
to a straw man and, upon his ouster from the property, bring an action in
the name of John Doe for trespass in ejectment.58 This fiction became
refined and elaborate and expanded to take up most real property litigation
by the Tudor period:
The development of this action is a long story and about such a matter it is hard
to fix any dates—one cannot tell the exact moment at which a proceeding
becomes fictitious—but I believe we may say that during the Tudor reigns the
action of ejectment became the regular mode of recovering the possession of
land.59

The   “real   actions”   remained   for   their   utility   in   special   cases   and  
eventually, albeit not until the nineteenth century in England, the action for
ejectment was reformed to eliminate the element of legal fiction.60
Moreover, in the intervening years, various forms of equity were also
utilized to meet the demands of the unprovided-for case where a petitioner
had possession but knew of a competing claim that cast doubt on his right
to the land.61
In reasonably short form, such is the history of the development of the
forms of action relating to title to land as it stood around the time of the
procedural reforms that attempted to do away with all of this nonsense.
And it makes a case for trans-substantive civil procedure, as each attempt
to provide a substance-specific avenue for the pursuit of title actions falls in
favor of a newer, faster, more flexible alternative. However, it is worth
noting   a   number   of   things.      To   begin   with,   the   “boundary   disputes”   that  
were arguably the fatal flaw in this system arose from specific conflicts
over jurisdiction that required the pretext of distinct forms of action, not
from any lack of understanding of the nature of the action or the remedy
sought. The story is complicated, but its complexity was context dependent
and was not the product of substance specificity itself. As Part II will
demonstrate, this proliferation of writs was easily reformed during the
56
57
58
59
60
61

MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 51–52.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 58–59; see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *150–51.
MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 59.
Id. at 60–61.
See, e.g., infra notes 62–83 and accompanying text.
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nineteenth century into two readily and rationally distinguishable forms of
action—one at law for dispossessed claimants and the other in equity for
parties in possession who wanted to remove a cloud on their title.62 It is
unclear whether the nineteenth century requirement to plead one or the
other of these two fundamental forms of title action at the outset of a case
caused a vast amount of unfair prejudice in the form of dismissals, as the
critics of substance-specific procedure suggest.63
Finally, as any practitioner dealing with these matters can tell, the
forms of action discussed by Maitland never entirely disappeared from the
substantive law—they persist in the form of claims and remedies.64
Procedure reform was just that—a reform of procedure—with the
substantive law that was once so closely attached to procedure left
unmoored as free-floating  “causes  of  action.”65 A plaintiff in contemporary
practice need only state a claim in simple terms, but ultimately must prove
a set of defined elements and mold his or her case to those elements in a
process no less restrictive than the old forms of action from which these
“causes   of   action”   derive.66 The liberality of contemporary procedure
derives not from elimination of category distinctions from the law but from
the possibility of amendment and the elimination of demurrer practice.
II. CONTEMPORARY TITLE ACTIONS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF REFORM
As   Maitland   himself   said:   “The   forms   of   action   we   have   buried,   but  
they   still   rule   us   from   their   graves.”67 The persistence of the forms of
action in the substantive side of civil practice can be seen by taking a look
at a recent ejectment case in Georgia.68 Georgia is an interesting state to
look at in studying the more recent evolution of the common law forms of
See discussion infra Part III.
As authority for their contention that common law pleading consisted   in   large   part   of   “petty  
haggling over  pointless  distinctions,”  resulting  in  unfairness  and  a  waste  of  judicial  resources, the critics
of substance-specific procedure tend to either cite to one another or simply assert the premise as selfevident. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1974 & n.12 (1989) (citing no authority); Carrington, supra note 11, at 2080 n.77
(citing to himself); Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 1885 n.77 (citing Carrington and Shapiro).
64 See Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note  12,  at  915  (“[The]  organized  body  of  what  is  
now  commonly  called  substantive  law  evolved  from  the  writs.”).
65 See id. at 975–82  (discussing  the  attempt  to  purge  the  concept  of  a  “cause  of  action”  from  the  
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
66 See Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 1155, 1177 (1993):
No matter how we describe it, most civil litigation examines events and determines if they
add up to believed facts which fit within the elements of a cause of action. I have written
about how Clark and his cohorts eschewed the terms facts and cause of action. But that is
the reality within which litigators have to work. . . . Many of the individual pieces of the
litigation process—pleading, 12(b)(6), discovery, burdens of production and persuasion,
relevancy issues, summary judgment, directed verdict, jury instructions, opening and
closing arguments, one's sense of various methods of ADR—require a mastery of the
concept of causes of action and their elements.
67 MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 2.
68 MVP Investment Co. v. North Fulton Express Oil, 639 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
62
63
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action   in   their   reincarnation   as   substantive   “causes”   of   action,   divorced  
from the rigid procedural formulas of writ pleading practice, because
Georgia was one of the first states to attempt codification of the substance
of the common law, including the maxims of equity enacted as actual
statutes.69 With respect to land title actions, the original Georgia Code of
1863 contained a statutory provision for equitable action to quiet title in the
form  of  what  eventually  came  to  be  known  as  “conventional  quia timet.”70
This was modeled after the traditional bill in equity seeking an injunction
to prevent an anticipated future harmful   act,   “quia   timet”   being   Latin   for  
“because   he   fears.”71 The ordinary proceeding at common law for
ejectment was similarly codified, albeit later, in the 1895 code.72
Accordingly, on the one hand, ejectment was available in cases of
dispossession.    On  the  other  hand,  in  cases  involving  a  “cloud  on  title,”  in  
which the plaintiff was in possession but feared a challenge to title or
possession due to the existence of, for example, a void deed, the action in
equity was the appropriate avenue for seeking relief because ejectment did
not provide an adequate remedy at law.73
In 1917, the Georgia General Assembly attempted to provide an
alternative mechanism for establishing title to land in the Georgia Land
Registration Act of 1917.74 This Act allows a petitioner to obtain
certification from the superior court of their title to the land by means of an
in rem action, with notice to interested parties and adjoining landowners.75
The action is noticed both by publication in newspapers and by physical
posting on the property.76 In practice, this procedure is seldom utilized,
either because lawyers are more familiar with the older causes of action,
which remain in place, or because they are suspicious of a procedure that
69 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 23-1-6   (1982)   (“Nature   of   equity—Follows   the   law”).      For   the
history  of   Georgia’s  codification  efforts,  beginning  in  1860–63, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Codification
and Consequences: The Georgian Motif, 14 GA. L. REV. 737 (1980). Regarding codification, see
generally Nathan M. Crystal, Codification and the Rise of the Restatement Movement, 54 WASH. L.
REV. 239 (1979) and Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: The Anticlassical Jurisprudence of
Anticodification, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149 (2007).
70 GA. CODE § 3153 (1863) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-40 to -44 (1982)
(conventional quia timet)).
71 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (8th ed. 2004); see also STORY, supra note 9, at ch. XXI
(discussing the quia timet bill in traditional equity practice).
72 GA. CIV. CODE § 5004 (1895) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-11-1 to -15 (2002)
(ejectment)).
73 See Newcomer v. Newcomer, 606 S.E.2d 238, 239 (Ga. 2004):
The reason of this rule is that, where the defendant is in possession, the plaintiff has a
remedy to test his title at law by bringing an action in ejectment, which is ordinarily
deemed an adequate remedy, and in consequence there is no ground for the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction, which is based upon the fact that, where the plaintiff is in possession,
he can maintain no action at law to test his title.
(quoting Mentone Hotel & Realty Co. v. Taylor, 130 S.E. 527, 529 (Ga. 1925)).
74 Currently codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-2-60 to -84 (2008). See GEORGE PINDAR,
GEORGIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PROCEDURE WITH FORMS § 25-10 (Daniel F. Hinkel ed., 6th ed.
2004) (discussing the procedure).
75 PINDAR, supra note 73, § 25-10.
76 GA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-67 (2008).
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requires  broad  notification  of  a  weakness  in  their  client’s  claim  of  title  to  
outside parties and another set of records to keep track of in addition to
deeds, certificates of registration that are physically issued to the owner as
proof of title.77
In 1966, the Georgia General Assembly tried again to reform title
litigation by passing the Quiet Title Act of 1966, this time creating a
statutory   proceeding   called   “quia   timet   against   all   the   world.”78 This
statutory proceeding allows any person claiming an estate in land, defined
as  “an  estate  of  freehold  present  or  future  or  any  estate  for  years  of  which  at  
least   five   years   are   unexpired,”   to   bring   an   action   to   obtain   a   court   order  
recognizing their rights in the property, regardless of whether they are in
possession and regardless of whether they are able to identify a specific
“cloud”  on  their  asserted  title.79 The proceeding applies to boundary line
disputes and disputes relating to easements.80 The statutory scheme
provides for appointment of a special master to determine who should
receive notice and hear the title question.81 Upon receipt and acceptance of
the   master’s   report,   title   is   noted   in   the   land   records   themselves   and   no  
separate certification issues.82
Viewed in light of its history, the purpose of this enactment was to
create a convenient, omnibus special proceeding for all instances in which
the central dispute is with respect to title to land, with its own pleading
requirements and specific set of remedies.83 However, the prior causes of
action in ejectment and conventional quia timet were not repealed; indeed,
the act expressly states that it is not intended as an exclusive remedy.84
This  raises  the  question,  “why  not?”    One suspects that the real reason the
legislature left the Georgia Code littered with increasingly overlapping
remedies, where once there were distinct remedies for distinct purposes,
was fear of unintended consequences that might deprive someone of a
remedy.85 This is the old view of the law as an organic thing, each part

77
78

11.

PINDAR, supra note 73, § 25-10.
Currently codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-60 to -73 (1991). PINDAR, supra note 73, § 25-

GA. CODE ANN. § 23-3-61 (1982).
See Middleton v. Robinson, 244 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. 1978) (boundary lines); Wiggins v. S. Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 266 S.E. 2d 148 (Ga. 1980) (easements).
81 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-63 to -66 (1982).
82 Id. § 23-3-67 (1982).
83 See id. § 23-3-60:
The purpose of this part is to create a procedure for removing any cloud upon the title to
land, including the equity of redemption by owners of land sold at tax sales, and for readily
and conclusively establishing that certain named persons are the owners of all the interests
in land defined by a decree entered in such proceeding, so that there shall be no occasion
for land in this state to be unmarketable because of any uncertainty as to the owner of every
interest therein.
84 Id. § 23-3-72 (1982).
85 See Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 418–20
(2004) (discussing fear of unintended consequences as a rationale  for  what  the  author  calls  “historical  
justification”  of  legal  doctrine).
79
80
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linked to the other in ways that are so complex that coherent, constructive
reform is difficult if not entirely impossible.86
An example of why this attitude persists can be found in the case of
MVP Investment Co. v. North Fulton Express Oil.87 In MVP, the plaintiff, a
land developer, alleged that an adjoining landowner had built an earth slope
on   the   plaintiff’s   property   in   order   to   provide   lateral   support   to   the  
defendant’s   property.88 The plaintiff brought the action in plain trespass,
seeking damages, and the defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that
the four-year statute of limitations for actions to recover for trespass to
realty had passed.89 The plaintiff, apparently in response to the appearance
of this defect in its case and not from any newfound interest in clarifying its
title   to   the   land,   took   advantage   of   Georgia’s   liberal   amendment   rules   to  
amend its complaint to add a claim for ejectment, in essence recasting the
claim as a title claim for which the period of limitation would derive from
the adverse possession statute and not the statute respecting trespass to
realty.90 The Georgia court of appeals allowed this, holding that the
plaintiff had a legitimate claim for ejectment.91
This was undoubtedly the correct decision in the narrow sense that the
court correctly applied the cited precedents to the facts before it.92
Conceptually, it is probably the correct outcome because, as the court
argues, the dirt slope is certainly analogous to a structure erected by
someone else and occupying the land, which would very clearly raise a title
issue.93 As soon as the court accepted the framing of the issue as being
whether the dirt slope constituted a continuing occupation of the property
authorizing ejectment, the court appears to have had no choice but to
decide as it did.
On another level, however, the case is a bit troubling. At first blush,
this case appears to support an argument for trans-substantivity and against
86 See David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (1991) (describing
suspicion  of  “rationalism”  and  “modernism”  as  “law’s  aboriginal  grand  tradition”).
87 639 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
88 Id. at 534.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 535.
92 See id. at 534–35 (citing Wachstein v. Christopher, 57 S.E. 511, 512–13 (Ga. 1907) (holding
foundation occupying  plaintiff’s  property  subject  to  removal);;  Navajo  Constr.  v.  Bringham,  608  S.E.2d  
732,  734  (Ga.  Ct.  App.  2004)  (holding  a  portion  of  a  neighbor’s  house  occupying  plaintiff’s  property  
subject to removal); Dep’t  of  Transp.  v.  Arnold,  530  S.E.2d  767,  771–72 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that  government’s  “slope  easement”  constituted a taking).
93 See MVP, 639 S.E.2d at 534:
Georgia law allows an owner of real property to bring an ejectment action to remove an
adjoining property owner who, either by inadvertence or with predatory intent, encroaches
upon the property of his neighbor. The purpose of the action is to eject the defendant from
possession of the disputed land. A land  owner’s  entitlement  to  an  action  in  ejectment  stems  
from our deep-rooted belief that the owner of real property has the right to possess, use,
enjoy, and dispose of it, and the corresponding right to exclude others from the use.
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
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substance-specific procedure in that the plaintiff is protected by liberal
modern pleading and amendment rules from any negative consequences
arising from the fact that it chose initially to cast its complaint as an action
for trespass, thus avoiding the alleged evil of punishing litigants for
technical pleading defects.94 On the other hand, it is difficult not to see the
attempt to reconfigure this case as an ejectment action as something of a
pretext, given that the plaintiff really wanted monetary damages for the
reduction in value of their property and not a writ of possession and award
of mesne profits (the remedy in an ejectment action).95 Turning the case
into a title action was clever lawyering, and no doubt a serious incentive to
settlement by the defendant, but it is difficult to see this as being much
different from the legal fictions of the writ-pleading era.96
For present purposes, however, it is enough to note that the existence
of special, substance-specific statutory proceedings respecting title to land
did nothing to prevent the plaintiff in MVP from saving its case by
recasting it as a title action. Moreover, this would likely have still been the
case even if the Georgia legislature had enacted the omnibus remedy to
quiet title as the exclusive form of proceeding in title cases. Imagine that
the   Georgia   General   Assembly   had   established  the   “quia  timet   against  all  
the  world”  remedy  as  the  sole  and  exclusive  means  of  trying  title  issues  in  
Georgia. The critics of substance-specific reform argue or imply that
substance-specific procedure will have the same perceived fundamental
problems as existed under code pleading—endless arguments regarding the
nature of the claim and dismissal of cases for pleading errors.97 In this
instance, however, there is no reason to assume that resort to an exclusive
substance-specific procedural mechanism would necessarily have been
unavailable  by  amendment  under  Georgia’s  liberal  version  of  Rule  15,  with  
relation back to preserve the claim against the statute of limitations.98 The
infamous arguments over technicalities in code pleading were more a
product of demurrer practice than of substance specificity in the abstract.99
94 See John S. Beckerman, Confronting   Civil   Discovery’s   Fatal   Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505,
513–15  (2000)  (identifying  the  avoidance  of  “dispositions  on  the  basis  of  technicalities  of  pleading”  as  
a principal benefit of contemporary procedure).
95 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-11-7 (mesne profits), -14 (writ of possession) (2002).
96 Notoriously and ironically associated with the action in ejectment. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
97 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
98 See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-15 (2006); see also id. § 9-11-81:
[The Georgia Civil Practice Act] shall apply to all special statutory proceedings except to
the extent that specific rules of practice and procedure in conflict herewith are expressly
prescribed by the law; but, in any event, the provisions of [the Georgia Civil Practice Act]
governing the sufficiency of pleadings, defenses, amendments, counterclaims, cross-claims,
third-party practice, joinder of parties and causes, making parties, discovery and
depositions, interpleader, intervention, evidence, motions, summary judgment, relief from
judgments, and the effect of judgments shall apply to all such proceedings.
99 See Hill v. Lariscy, 165 S.E.2d 315, 316–17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) (explaining the difference
between the demurrer and the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Martin v. Approved
Bancredit Corp., 163 S.E.2d 885, 886 (Ga. 1968) (same); see also Burbank, supra note  10,  at  1940  (“No  
one I know is suggesting a return to the forms of action or a wholesale rejection of trans-substantive
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Moreover, if anything is clear from MVP, it is that boundary disputes
among conceptual categories of cases persist, despite trans-substantive
procedures, due to the persistence of category distinctions in the
substantive law.100
In  any  event,  the  “quia  timet  against  all  the  world”  remedy,  enacted  in  
the form of a non-exclusive proceeding, shows that substance-specific
reform need not be in the form of exclusive categories of proceeding, but
can instead appear in the form of procedural alternatives. In sum, a broad
range of substance-specific procedural mechanisms exist at the state level
in the form of remedy-specific special statutory proceedings, and this
reality does not necessarily lead to trial by technicality.
III. ACCOUNTING AND THE HISTORY OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
Let us turn now to a proposal for a more innovative procedural reform
premised on the accounting remedy scenario discussed in the introduction.
The equitable accounting remedy needs to be understood in terms of its
historical origins as a remedy with a procedural focus—a mechanism for
providing a specific form of discovery to litigants able to avail themselves
of equity, discovery that was not available in the ordinary course of civil
practice at the time.101 A return to the remedial understanding of discovery
on which this form of proceeding was premised provides the basis for a
useful procedural alternative in fiduciary cases. As discussed in the next
section, it even suggests a way around the fraught political and ideological
difficulties at the heart of the current debate regarding discovery reform.
There was a procedure for accounting at law in common law pleading
practice, which developed in response to the problem of assessing
unliquidated damages against manorial bailiffs, for example, who collected
rents and managed property on behalf of a landlord.102 Over time,
however, equity courts proved to be a more flexible and efficient venue for
accounting actions, in part because of the availability of more effective
enforcement mechanisms.103 This remedy in equity was initially limited to
cases involving  the  “special  grounds  of  equity”  such  as  accident,  mistake or
fraud.104 But it quickly expanded to include other cases because it fulfilled
a legitimate and substantial need for this type of discovery in aid of
restitution in cases of unjust enrichment by fiduciaries.105
procedure.”).
100 These distinctions not only persist but have continued to evolve. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey,
Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225 (2001) (discussing category distinctions in general and
describing  the  evolution  of  Justice  Holmes’  understanding  of  torts  as  a  category  organized  around  the  
negligence principle).
101 See STORY, supra note 9, at §§ 436–45; see also Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 463–67
(discussing the history of the accounting remedy).
102 Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 464.
103 Id. at 466.
104 STORY, supra note 9, §§ 437–40.
105 Id.
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Accounting remained part of the more or less unique province of
equity   until   1848,   when   New   York   adopted   David   Dudley   Field’s   “Field  
Code”   and   began   the   still   unfinished   process   of   banishing   the   distinction  
between law and equity.106 “Code   practice”   was   adopted   in   a   number   of  
other jurisdictions and was an inspiration for the adoption of the merger of
law and equity in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.107 This in turn
inspired its universal adoption at the state level and, along with it, liberal,
trans-substantive discovery rules.108 With minor variations from one
jurisdiction to the next, every American jurisdiction now allows extremely
liberal discovery in civil practice without regard to whether the case is one
that traditionally would have been brought in law or equity.109 And, with a
few peculiar exceptions of little or no real consequence, the states purport
to have abolished entirely the concept of exclusive jurisdiction over equity
cases in special courts of equity.110
The truth about the merger of law and equity from the standpoint of
practitioners  “on  the  ground,”  however,  is  a  good  deal  more  complicated.    
To   begin   with,   “equitable   remedies   and   defenses”   persist   as   distinct  
creatures with distinct rules, both substantive and procedural.111 Moreover,
equity continues to have an impact on jurisdiction, despite the creation of
courts  of  “general”  jurisdiction.112
106 See Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 12, at 931–40 (discussing the merger of law
and equity in the Field Code).
107 Id. at 943–82.
108 Id. Note, however,  that  Subrin  is  very  critical  of  the  view  that  the  Field  Code  was  “a  parent  of”  
the Federal Rules, because he wants to emphasize the ways in which the Code continued common law
pleading. See id. at 931–40.
109 See 4 STATE OF NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947, COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY 611   (Comm.   Record   1947)   (“In   final   result,   New   Jersey,   Arkansas,   Mississippi   and  
Delaware remained the only states which still have an independent Court of Chancery with a separate
body of judges administering equity   exclusively.”).      Of   these   four   states,   Arkansas   eliminated   its  
Chancery courts in 2001. See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78
WASH. L. REV. 429, 496 n.409 (2003).
110 New Jersey still has a Chancery division of its superior court, which serves a purpose similar to
the Delaware Court of Chancery in providing judges with special expertise in business matters. Main,
supra note 109, at 496 n.409. The other states that have retained the nomenclature of distinct courts,
such as Mississippi and Tennessee, have so far departed from the original distinction between law
courts  and  equity  courts  that  the  use  of  the  word  “Chancery”  to  describe  these  courts  is  an  anachronism  
with little if any contemporary meaning. Id.
111 See DOBBS, supra note 1, §§ 2.1–2.6.
112 In   Georgia,   for   example,   the   constitution   of   the   state   provides   for   direct   appeal   of   “equity  
cases”  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia.    See GA. CONST. art.  VI  §  6,  ¶  III  (“Unless  otherwise  provided
by law, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction of . . .  [a]ll  equity  cases.”).    That  court  has  
responded to the resulting burden by narrowing its understanding  of  “equity  cases”  to  such  an  extent  as  
to essentially eliminate its jurisdiction over cases involving equitable remedies and defenses, taking the
transparently self-serving position that the cases that come before them involving injunctions and so
forth are really determined by legal issues and the role of equity is secondary. See Redfearn v.
Huntcliff   Homes   Ass’n,   524 S.E.2d 464, 465–67 (Ga. 1999). However, the distinction remains,
haunting sleep and sowing confusion. See, e.g.,  Viola  E.  Buford  Family  Ltd.  P’ship  v.  Britt,  642  S.E.2d  
383,  384  n.1  (Ga.  Ct.  App.  2007)  (“We  note  that  the  Supreme  Court  has  determined  that this equity case
does  not  fall  within  its  jurisdiction.”).    Similarly,  distinctions between law and equity continue to limit
the jurisdiction of probate courts and other special statutory courts in Georgia, leading to the strange
result that it is now possible  to  obtain  an  order  in  probate  court  directing  the  fiduciary  of  a  decedent’s  
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One example of the confusion arising from the persistence of equity in
both substance and procedure is the remedy of equitable accounting. As
traditionally understood, this remedy has been difficult to reconcile with
contemporary discovery rules that allow a party to obtain any financial
information from a fiduciary without making a showing of entitlement
other than the allegations in the good faith pleading.113 In response to this
confusion,  Professor  Joel  Eichengrun  proposed  “remedying  the  remedy.”114
Witnessing  the  accounting  remedy’s  loss  of  most  of  its  utility  and  meaning  
under contemporary procedure rules, Professor Eichengrun called for the
remedy to be re-conceived around what he viewed as its sole remaining
core of utility—the fact that it provides for an award of profits where a
party has unjustly benefited from the use of a trust fund.115 Indeed,
Professor Eichengrun called for opening this narrower remedy up to
litigants outside of the fiduciary realm.116
There are, however, problems with this approach. To begin with, the
core of the accounting remedy as reconceived by Professor Eichengrun—
the fact that it provides an avenue for obtaining an award of profits—is
neither unique nor sufficiently free-standing to justify retaining the concept
of accounting as an independent remedy. The remedial benefits of
“accounting   for   profits”   identified   by   Professor   Eichengrun   should   be  
available to a litigant through the ordinary avenues of the law of restitution
and unjust enrichment.117 Moreover, in light of the availability of
estate  to  act  in  a  certain  way  if,  and  only  if,  you  promise  not  to  call  it  an  “injunction.”    See Patterson v.
Ellerbee, 603 S.E.2d 308, 311 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (Barnes, J., dissenting)   (recognizing   Georgia’s  
constitutional grant of exclusive equity jurisdiction to the superior courts); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-9-127
(2005)   (“Probate   courts . . . shall have concurrent jurisdiction with superior courts with regard to the
proceedings for . . . [d]eclaratory judgments involving fiduciaries.”);;   id. § 15-9-120 (limiting
applicability of the article to counties with population in excess of 96,000); id. § 9-4-4 (defining the
scope  of  the  declaratory  judgment  as  including  orders  “direct[ing] the executor, administrator, or trustee
to do or abstain from doing any particular  act  in  his  fiduciary  capacity”).
113 See, e.g.,  Thompson  v.  Coughlin,  997  P.2d  191,  196  (Or.  2000)  (finding  that  plaintiff’s  access  
to discovery obviated the need for an accounting and that the parties were, accordingly, entitled to a
jury trial).
114 See Eichengrun, supra note 2.
115 See id. at 485:
The  true  accounting  yields  a  restitutionary  award  of  a  defendant’s  profits;;  the  “accounting”  
to settle complex or mutual accounts functionally grants a non-jury trial; and a now
obsolete   remedy   also   called   an   “accounting”   compelled   discovery   in   cases   of   disputed  
accounts. . . . Finally, a theoretical consideration of the accounting suggests that the remedy
be expanded to include the situation where a non-fiduciary has profited from the wrongful
use  of  another’s  property.
116 See id.
117 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2005) (awarding restitution in cases of breach of fiduciary duty); James Steven Rogers,
Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment,
42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55 (2007) (describing much of the terminology associated with restitutionary
remedies   as   “gibberish”   arising   from   the   traditional   conception   of   restitution   as   “parasitic”   on   other  
substantive  law  and  asserting  as  the  core  remedial  premise  of  the  law  of  restitution  the  principle  that  “a  
party who unjustifiably enriches himself at the expense of another owes a duty to pay a sum of money
that will disgorge the enrichment”).    But see DOBBS, supra note 1, § 4.3(5) (following Eichengrun in
identifying accounting for profits as a conceptually distinct restitutionary remedy).
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discovery and, in complex cases, auditors, the procedurally distinct aspects
of the accounting remedy—for example, the shifting of the burden of proof
to the defendant with respect to set-offs and the availability of non-jury
trials—seem less than compelling as reasons to retain the remedy as a
distinct conceptual entity.118 Furthermore, the burden-shifting advanced by
Professor Eichengrun as a primary advantage of the accounting remedy is
not necessarily limited to accounting cases.119
Another   reason   Professor   Eichengrun’s   proposal   has   failed   to   attract  
adherents may be that lawyers, by training, fear semantic confusion much
less than they fear the possibility of rights being left without a remedy.
Accordingly, there may be a tendency to allow remedies to linger past their
“sell  by”  date.120 Still, the continuing existence of accounting as a separate
statutory remedy may generate confusion among lawyers who are not legal
historians. Confusion costs clients money.
It could be, however, that some of this confusion derives from the fact
that,  from  the  practitioner’s  standpoint,  an  accounting  may  be  all  that  one  
wants, at least initially. Imagine an attorney with a trust client who came
into  her  office  concerned  about  a  trustee’s  refusal  to  provide  information,  
but   with   no   clear   evidence   of   foul   play.      In   the   author’s   own   experience,  
private fiduciaries often withhold information, not necessarily because they
have committed some offense, but because they either do not like to be
second-guessed by their beneficiary, they do not like to admit that their
accounts are not neatly in order, or they simply do not want to go to the
trouble of complying with a request for information about the trust.
Nevertheless, if a fiduciary refuses to surrender documents, the lawyer
ultimately is forced to bring a breach of duty claim in order to get
discovery.121
Of course, it is possible in a fiduciary case simply to bring a suit for
accounting. But this makes little sense, both because the remedy as
traditionally conceived has been more or less emptied of meaning by
contemporary discovery rules,122 and also because the rules as currently
For a discussion of these procedural aspects, see Eichengrun, supra note 2, at 477–81.
See, e.g., Cochran v. Ogletree, 536 S.E.2d 194, 196–97 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding burden of
proof placed on defendant to establish set-off   in   case   of   unjust   enrichment   for   “money   had   and  
received”).
120 See Schwab   v.   Philip   Morris   USA,   449   F.   Supp.   2d   992,   1020   (E.D.N.Y.   2006)   (“[I]t   is   a  
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or
action  at  law,  whenever  that  right  is  invaded.”)  (quoting   Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
163 (1803)); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 123–24 (1982)
(describing and justifying the inherent conservatism  of  attorneys  as  a  “retentionist  bias”).
121 Some states have experimented with allowing pre-litigation discovery. See, e.g., OHIO R. CIV.
P. 34(D). However, pre-litigation discovery is allowable under the Federal Rules only in the form of a
deposition, and only where the court finds that a pre-litigation deposition is necessary to   “prevent   a  
failure   or   delay   of   justice.”      FED. R. CIV. P. 27. Moreover, even those states allowing pre-litigation
discovery of documents require a finding of necessity and do not sanction pre-litigation discovery as a
mechanism for ascertaining whether a claim exists. See OHIO R. CIV. P. 34(D)(3)(b) (West Supp. 2007)
(requiring a finding  that  the  plaintiff  is  “otherwise  unable  to  bring  the  contemplated  action”).
122 For an example of the practical consequences of discovery stripping equitable accounting of its
118
119
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designed favor bringing claims together and may punish people for failing
to bring related claims.123 So, the default option becomes a suit for breach
of trust and an accounting.
The  plaintiff’s  attorney  can  console  herself  with  the  fact  that  failure  to  
account to a beneficiary is itself a breach of fiduciary duty and may also be
sufficient to support a good-faith claim of breach of fiduciary duty by
mismanagement of funds or under some other theory. 124 However, there
are two problems with this approach on the practical (as opposed to the
conceptual) level. First, any efficiency which may derive from requiring
litigants to bring all of their claims together may be lost when it results in
bringing the entire mechanism of a civil action to bear on disputes that may
only be a simple failure of communication. Second, the claim that a
fiduciary’s  failure  to  comply  with  pre-litigation demands for documents is
itself a basis for a damages claim of breach of fiduciary duty, however
conceptually neat it may appear on the surface, is something of a legal
fiction with a real cost in terms of public perceptions of the litigation
process as plaintiffs are forced to bring a hypothetical claim in order to find
out whether they have a stronger one.
Accordingly, although the accounting remedy as viewed through the
lens of substantive reform is a relic that could be simply done away with,
its persistence suggests the possibility of procedural reform such as an
alternative discovery process conceived in remedial terms. Imagine a
special statutory proceeding for accounting in which certain plaintiffs with
a basis for entitlement to an accounting could come forth in a separate
action and demand a formal, judicially managed accounting of the fund.
The defendant would either dispute the entitlement or produce an
accounting, with the assistance of a neutral, court-appointed auditor where
appropriate. Upon acceptance of the accounting by the court as sufficient
and complete, the parties would then have an opportunity to request
additional discovery and exchange a demand for relief and response. Such
demand  could  be  premised  on  any  available  legal  theory  and  “tried”  in  an  
evidentiary hearing before the court, sitting without a jury. Or the plaintiff
could file a new civil action in common form without fear of res judicata
except as to the issues actually decided in the accounting case.

original purpose, see Thompson v. Coughlin, 997 P.2d 191, 196 (Or. 2000) (finding that discovery had
allowed the plaintiff to establish an amount certain for damages, thus obviating the need for an
accounting in equity, with the consequence that the case could proceed at law subject to a jury trial
demand).
123 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982):
When   a   valid   and   final   judgment   rendered   in   an   action   extinguishes   the   plaintiff’s  
claim . . . , the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected
transactions, out of which the action arose.
124 GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 141 (6th ed.   1987)   (“Duty   to   Furnish   Information   to the
Beneficiary”).    This  duty,  though  broad,  is  subject  to  a  reasonableness  limitation.    Id.
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The benefit of this procedure is that it would allow the plaintiff to
come forward and demand what she actually wants—access to the books to
determine whether she has a claim—without having to premise this access
on vague and poorly substantiated claims. Moreover, it would tailor
discovery to the circumstances by focusing the initial stage of discovery on
obtaining an audit of the funds in question, or the equivalent. Once that is
established, the parties could pursue any trial preparation discovery that
they needed, such as the deposition of experts, with a court-approved audit
in hand. From   a   defendant’s   point   of   view,   it would allow litigants to
engage in a fishing expedition only after an initial showing of entitlement,
such as an affidavit establishing a right to the accounting.
This procedure could be limited to the cases in which an equitable
accounting has traditionally been available: trust cases, partnership
disputes, financial litigation involving complex, mutual accounts, et cetera.
Indeed, given the continuing availability of ordinary discovery to litigants
willing and able to state a good faith claim of breach of fiduciary duty, this
procedure may seldom be used. On the other hand, the remedial
understanding of discovery on which this proposal is premised might turn
out to have a wider application. The next part takes a broader look at
discovery and its origins in equity procedure.
IV. REVIVING THE BILL OF DISCOVERY
The debate regarding substance-specific reform of civil procedure
began with a general discussion about the pitfalls of trans-substantive
procedure’s   attempt   to   capture   all   of   the   nuances   of   civil   practice   in   one  
conception of the civil action.125 However, the discussion quickly evolved
into a more nuanced argument regarding the influence of equity procedure
on rules reform, focusing on modern discovery practice.126 At least one
commentator,   Stephen   Subrin,   identified   this   “conquest”   of   equity   over  
common law procedure as the source of pretty much everything that is
wrong with contemporary civil litigation, from delay of outcomes to the
death of the trial, with the primary evil being liberal discovery rules.127 As
an alternative,   Subrin   called   for   “selective   substance-specific   procedure”  
reform through the establishment of default discovery limits specific to
broad substantive categories of lawsuits,128 such as products liability or
professional negligence.

See Cover, supra note 10, at 732–33:
It is by no means intuitively apparent that the procedural needs of a complex antitrust
action, a simple automobile negligence case, a hard-fought school integration suit, and an
environmental class action to restrain the building of a pipeline are sufficiently identical to
be usefully encompassed in a single set of rules which makes virtually no distinctions
among such cases in terms of available process.
126 See Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 12, at 919, 1001.
127 Id. at 910–12, 983.
128 See Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 10, at 28.
125
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In assessing this argument, we should begin by discussing what is
meant  by  “equity  jurisprudence.”    The  classic  tale  of  the  origins  of  equity  
jurisprudence is that it arose to ameliorate injustices arising from too strict
an application of common law rules, most notably procedural rules. This is
a conception  of  equity’s  origins  with  its  roots  in  Aristotle’s  discussion,  in  
Nichomacean Ethics,   of   “epieikeia”   as   a   force   moderating   the   strict  
demands   of   the   law,   “a   rectification   of   legal   justice.”129 As recounted
recently by Thomas Main, the story goes something like this:
The Chancellor unrolled a vast body  of  legal  principle  that  we  know  as  “equity”  
to offer relief in those cases where, because of the technicality of procedure,
defective methods of proof, and other shortcomings in the common law, there
was   no   “plain,   adequate   and   complete”   remedy   otherwise available. . . .
Intervention was premised on the notion that justice incorporated the moral sense
of the community, existing as a function not only   of   a   community’s   technical  
rules,  but  also  of  “magisterial  good  sense,  unhampered  by  rule.” 130

In this conception, flexibility and common sense are identified as the
essential aspects of equity. However, much of the history of equity
jurisprudence as it was actually practiced has been identified as a fall from
grace—an abandonment of these principles by judges facing temptation in
the form of precedent and rule-making and finding themselves unable to
resist.131
It is interesting to note that earlier historians of equity jurisprudence
were quite critical of this explanation, viewing it as an origins myth that
tells us more about the ideological justifications for equity than it does
about the actual circumstances of its origins.132 For example, Joseph Story
essentially rejects the notion that equity arose as a general corrective action
against the rigidity in the classical common law, arguing instead that equity
arose from the need for specific, unprovided-for remedies:
129 5 ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS Ch. 10 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books
further rev. ed. 2004) (1953).
130 Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429,
441–42 (2003).
131 See, e.g., PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 11–18 (1990); see also Fiona R. Burns, The Court of Chancery in the 19th
Century: A Paradox of Decline and Expansion, 21 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 198 (2001) (arguing against
this view in part, noting that the nineteenth-century Court of Chancery in England was in some ways
increasingly burdened by the transition from a discretionary to a precedential model of jurisprudence
but nonetheless managed to create new substantive equitable doctrines such as breach of confidence and
the equitable covenant).
132 See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *429–30 (2002):
EQUITY  then,  in  it’s  [sic]  true  and  genuine  meaning,  is  the  [s]oul  and  [s]pirit  of  all  law:  
po[s]itive law is con[s]trued, and rational law is made, by it. In this, equity is
[s]ynonymous to ju[s]tice; in that, to the true [s]en[s]e and [s]ound interpretation of the
rule. But the very terms of a court of equity and a court of law, as contra[s]ted to each
other, are apt to confound and mi[s]lead us: as if the one judged without equity, and the
other was not bound by any law. Whereas every definition or illu[s]tration to be met with,
which now draws a line between the two juri[s]dictions, by [s]etting law and equity in
oppo[s]ition to each other, will be found either totally erroneous, or erroneous to a certain
degree.
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Many persons, and especially foreigners, have often expressed surprise that
distinct courts should in England and America be established for the
administration of equity, instead of the whole administration of municipal justice
being confided to one and the same class of courts without any discrimination
between law and equity. But this surprise is founded almost wholly upon an
erroneous view of the nature of Equity Jurisprudence. It arises from confounding
the general sense of equity, which is equivalent to universal or natural justice, ex
æquo et bono, with its technical sense, which is descriptive of the exercise of
jurisdiction over peculiar rights and remedies.133

In other words, taking his lead from Blackstone, Story argued for a
view of equity jurisdiction as a simple function of certain remedies being
allowed in one set of courts as distinct from others, due to circumstances
unique to the Anglo-American history, and not as an attempt to embody
abstract principles about the administration of justice.134
It   is   impossible   to   read   Story’s   account   without   catching   a   whiff   of  
special pleading since he provides ample evidence, from sources both
ancient and contemporary   to   him,   that   the   association   of   “equity”   in   the  
legal   sense   with   “equity”   in   the   philosophical   sense   is   more   than   just   the  
result of confusion among classically educated foreigners.135 Still, it is
useful to understand that equity has sometimes been viewed as something
best defined not in the abstract, but in a more particular sense as a
collection of remedies. For the present purpose, it is worth noting that this
is how equity jurisprudence was defined by perhaps the most influential
treatise author of the period when the merger of law and equity began in
this country with the adoption of the Field Code.136
In   Story’s   version   of   the   history   of   equity,   the   key   factor   behind   the  
origin and expansion of equity was not the availability of in personam
STORY, supra note 9, at 26–31 (internal citations omitted).
See id. at   20   (“Equity   Jurisprudence   may   therefore   properly   be   said   to   be   that   portion   of  
remedial justice which is exclusively administered  by  a  Court  of  Equity”);; see also id. at  11  (“‘It  is  said’  
[Blackstone]  remarks  ‘that  it  is  the  business  of  a  Court  of  Equity  in  England  to  abate  the  rigor  of  the  
common   law.      But   no   such   power   is   contended   for.”   (quoting   WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3
COMMENTARIES 430)). Note that some commentators have been highly critical   of   Blackstone’s  
conception of equity. See, e.g., 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §
54   (Spencer   W.   Symons   ed.,   5th   ed.   1941)   (“This   is   one   example   among   many   of   Blackstone’s  utter  
inability to comprehend the real spirit and workings of the English law.”);;   see also Sir W. S.
Holdsworth, Blackstone’s  Treatment  of  Equity, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1929).
135 See STORY, supra note 9, at 1–22.    Story’s  special  pleading  here  is  in  defense  of  his  organic  
conception of the law as the product of a specific, complex history—a fundamentally conservative
vision of the law that led him to be critical of the contemporary codification movement. See GERALD T.
DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 315–18 (2d prtg. 1970); JAMES
MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL
THOUGHT 89–98 (1971).
136 Main acknowledges this definition but ultimately rejects it as being, among other things,
“circular.”     Thomas   O.  Main,   ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 345–46 (2005). Main
sees  a  bright  prospect  for  ADR  taking  on  what  he  conceives  to  be  equity’s  traditional  role  of  providing  
a flexible alternative to litigation. See id. at 344–53 (discussing the history of equity and citing
numerous nineteenth and early-twentieth century sources on the subject). For a contrary view, see
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from Equity Jurisprudence
and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57 (2004).
133
134
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relief in the form of the injunction to compel conduct outside of the
litigation itself—the primary factor in many more contemporary accounts
of  equity’s  history137—but the special power of the equity courts to compel
discovery.138 “Indeed,”  he  argues,  “every bill in equity may be said to be in
some sense a bill of discovery, since it asks for the personal oath of the
defendant, to purge himself in regard to the transactions stated in the
bill.”139 This liberal approach to discovery was the inspiration for the
approach taken in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when they made
their debut in 1938.140 It is also broadly understood that liberal discovery
has always had a dark side, with critics of expanded discovery procedure
identifying discovery, as opposed to increased formalism, as the source of
the infamous delays and backlogged dockets associated with Chancery
practice in nineteenth-century England.141 The fundamental problem is
described in Dickens’  famous  description  of  Chancery  court,  which  makes  
reference to the evolution of formalism in the adoption of equity
precedent—a common theme of contemporary critics142—but focuses
primarily on delay and expense:
On such an afternoon, some score of members of the High Court of Chancery bar
ought to be—as here they are—mistily engaged in one of the ten thousand stages
of an endless cause, tripping one another up on slippery precedents, groping
knee-deep in technicalities, running their goat-hair and horse-hair warded heads
against walls of words, and making a pretence of equity with serious faces, as
players might. On such an afternoon, the various solicitors in the cause, some
two or three of whom have inherited it from their fathers, who made a fortune by
it, ought to be—as are they not?—ranged in a line, in a long matted well (but you
might  look  in  vain  for  Truth  at  the  bottom  of  it),  between  the  registrar’s  red  table  
and the silk gowns, with bills, cross-bills, answers, rejoinders, injunctions,
affidavits,   issues,   references   to   masters,   masters’   reports,   mountains of costly
nonsense, piled before them.143

In a series of articles beginning in 1987, Professor Subrin elaborated
on this dark side of equity procedure, finding the origin of contemporary
procedure in equity to be the source of most, if not all, of the problems that
contemporary critics perceive in the Federal Rules and its state
counterparts—most notably, the delay and expense associated with
unlimited, largely unsupervised discovery practice.144 As an alternative,
Professor Subrin proposed a partial retreat from the trans-substantive
137 See, e.g., HOFFER, supra note 127, at 12–19 (identifying the origins of equity jurisprudence as
arising from conflict surrounding the special authority of the Chancery courts to exercise the royal
prerogative to compel attendance and enjoin conduct).
138 See STORY, supra note 9, at 22–23.
139 Id.
140 Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 12, at 943–75.
141 See id. at 977–84; see also id. at  1001  (“As  Dickens  and  others  had  known  for  centuries,  equity  
procedure is slow and cumbersome, and has a high potential for arbitrariness.”).
142 For a discussion of the role of precedent in the decline of Chancery practice, see Burns, supra
note 127.
143 CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 2 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1853).
144 Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 10, at 29–37.
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premise of the Federal Rules in the form of default, substance-specific
discovery limits to be established by consensus among stakeholders in the
various fields of litigation that are the “most   discovery-prone.”145 Most
cases, he argued, have very little need for discovery, and practitioners
would likely be willing to exchange most of their current discovery
entitlement for fixed trial dates at the outset of litigation.146 Those cases
that do require more extensive discovery should have it but would benefit
from default rules limiting discovery to those documents and depositions
identified by stakeholders as necessary to the specific type of case, with
discovery outside of those limits available only with leave of court.147
Subrin’s  conception  of  “substance”  differs  markedly  from  what  most  
people would anticipate because he is not really talking about substance in
the  sense  of  specific  claims  or  causes  of  action,  but  in  the  sense  of  “types”  
of lawsuits, broadly conceived.148 However, many critics renounced this
proposal as if it called for a return to the common law pleading practice,
arguing that this approach would encourage boundary disputes regarding
classification of cases and punish litigants for technical pleading errors.149
Moreover, the call for stakeholder consensus has been identified by
Subrin’s  critics as potentially more naive than the assumption of attorney
cooperation in discovery on which the current rules are premised.150
A different approach, which might be more palatable to some, would
be to allow a partial return to the older understanding of managed
discovery as a type of remedy—a substantive end rather than simply a
procedural means to other ends—the attractions of which were explored in
the previous part. However, a remedy-focused reform of discovery might
be significantly different, and in some ways actually more traditional, than
the subject-matter specific discovery limits proposed by Subrin. Instead, it
would involve the creation of an alternative procedural creature modeled
on the traditional bill of discovery.
Creating an alternative managed discovery procedure premised on an
understanding that managed discovery is something substantively different
from ordinary discovery might avoid some of the criticisms leveled at
Id. at 47–49.
Id. at 45–48.
Id. at 47–49.
Id. at  48  (identifying  “categories  of  cases,  such  as,  products  liability,  antitrust,  securities fraud,
section  1983,  employment  discrimination,  and  malpractice”  as  appropriate  targets  for  substance-specific
procedural reform).
149 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 11; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and TransSubstantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2238–47 (1989);
Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 761, 822–25 (1993).
150 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey
of  Discovery  “Reform,” 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.  197,  237  (2001)  (“It  may  be  too  difficult  to  effect
set rules in cases such as discrimination or product liability, where the affected parties fear the
distributional consequences  of  presumptive  limits  on  or  entitlements  to  discovery.”).    For  a  discussion  
of the flaws in the assumptions underlying attorney cooperation in discovery, see John S. Beckerman,
Confronting Civil Discovery’s  Fatal  Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 512–16 (2000).
145
146
147
148
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Subrin’s  approach  to  substance as a process of identifying and attempting
to   create   default   rules   for   various   “types”   of   litigation.      The   approach  
would be “substance-specific”   in   that   it   recognizes   some   forms   of  
procedure as more appropriate to some types of cases than others, without
requiring rule-makers or judges to decide what those types are. Instead,
litigants would be encouraged to decide what they want. The approach is
also substance-specific in that it understands discovery management as
something that litigants want as a substantive end in itself. Approaching
reform in this way might avoid, at least in part, the criticism that (a)
substance-specific procedure creates fertile ground for boundary disputes;
(b) it necessarily politicizes the reform process; and (c) it punishes litigants
for simple pleading errors. A flexible approach substituting the concept of
remedial managed discovery might also encourage a movement away from
current defense-oriented approaches to discovery reform, which create
barriers  to  entry  and  penalties  for  perceived  “abuse.”151
What would remedial discovery look like? Again, remedial discovery
would be managed discovery. Unlike the ordinary discovery motion,
which is essentially a plea for judicial intervention in a process intended to
be conducted by the parties, remedial discovery would involve a petition
for the appointment of a special master, not just to resolve specific
disputes, but to take an active role in developing a discovery plan for the
parties that is more than just a series of deadlines. This would ensure that
the case not only moves forward, but that it moves forward with
appropriately tailored discovery.
Of course, this is by no means the first call for management of
discovery by special masters appointed to take the ever-increasing burden
of case management. What makes this proposal somewhat different is the
recognition   of   the   “managed   case”   as   a   potentially   distinct   procedural  
entity with its own rules. This may sound like a fantasy, given stretched
judicial resources and the futility of so many efforts to increase judicial
management of discovery.152 A number of things are worth noting,
however.
For one thing, instead of attempting to increase case
management in every case, litigants would be permitted to choose more
intrusive and potentially limiting case management as an alternative
manner of proceeding. They would gain something that many practitioners
want in exchange for giving up some control over the process. This would
be very different from simply referring all discovery disputes to a discovery
master. Instead, it could co-exist with the current system as an alternative
for cases where one or more of the parties recognize a genuine need for
151 See Stempel, supra note 146; see also Beckerman, supra note 146, at 517–18 (identifying
problems associated with the expectation of cooperative discovery within the context of our adversarial
litigation culture). But see Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 1884–92 (arguing that adversarial litigation
systems have a special need for procedural equality).
152 See Stempel, supra note 146, at 241–45 (advocating for full-time discovery masters in the
federal system but recognizing the forces that might limit their effectiveness).
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case management. Moreover, the parties need not have access to the
special master of right. The court could serve as gatekeeper, and would
likely retain the power to sanction for genuine discovery abuse.
This procedure might also co-exist with the thin discovery option
proposed by Professor Subrin, where litigants agree to strict discovery
limits in exchange for a fast track to trial. This proposal recognizes the
reality that sometimes what the parties want is their day in court, and they
may be willing to give up their ordinary, broadly-defined discovery
entitlement to get it. Again, this is substance-specific procedure in the
broad sense of giving the parties access to procedural alternatives that they
think are better suited to their case, without requiring them to establish
entitlement by showing that their case conforms to any particular theory of
action, inspired by the recognition that discovery can be viewed as
something that people do or do not want in its own right.
The presence of these alternative approaches to discovery might lead
to a transformation of ordinary motion practice respecting discovery by
encouraging judges to view discovery motions less as a plea for case
management and more as a motion for sanctions, which currently are
seldom imposed in discovery disputes. In other words, creating the
possibility of discovery management by a special master would encourage,
but not necessarily require, judges to reconceive their role in ordinary
discovery motion practice, primarily policing against abusive practices
rather than resolving disputes about whether discovery requests are
appropriately tailored to the claims.
This approach would create
alternatives without reconfiguring civil practice in its entirety. Although
some will object to limits on discovery, it is important to note that limits
are already being imposed in the federal system and in forms that are much
less benign than a discovery plan imposed by a special master.153
CONCLUSION
The existence of categories of litigation that are politically charged,
with clearly defined classes of  litigants  standing  to  “win”  or  “lose”  in  the  
reform process, need not lead to the conclusion that any departure from the
trans-substantive premise of the rules would inevitably lead to favoritism in
the rule-making process. If we look at substance-specific procedure reform
outside  of  the  “political  cockpit,”  we  find  that  it  is  already  happening,  and  
is not necessarily frightening. Instead of containerizing reform in
politically contested categories, non-exclusive procedural alternatives
modeled after the special statutory procedures that already exist in state law
can provide a way to tailor procedure to the needs of litigants without the
risks associated with wholesale substance-specific reform.

153 See Stempel, supra note 146 (discussing recent attempts to reform civil discovery to remedy
perceived abuses).

